Pigou, Coase, Common Law, and Environmental Policy: Implications of the Calculation Debate

The implications of the calculation debate are explored for Pigouvian, Coasean, and common-law liability approaches to externality problems. There is no escaping Hayekian-Misean information problems, but the institutional setting within which environmental policies are resolved affects the domain of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPublic choice Vol. 87; no. 3/4; pp. 243 - 258
Main Author Pasour, E. C.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Leiden Kluwer Academic Publishers 01.06.1996
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Bargaining
Common Law
Contract negotiations
Costs
Crops
Debate
Economic costs
Economic externalities
ENVIRONMENT
Environmental Policy
Environmental regulation
Externality
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, NONEXECUTIVE
ORGANIZED COLLECTIVE ARGUMENT
Pigouvian taxes
POLITICAL PARTY
Property rights
PUBLIC POLICY
Railroads
Social costs
Subsidies
Transaction costs
United States
Welfare economics
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Summary:The implications of the calculation debate are explored for Pigouvian, Coasean, and common-law liability approaches to externality problems. There is no escaping Hayekian-Misean information problems, but the institutional setting within which environmental policies are resolved affects the domain of third-party calculation. The calculation required is likely to be significantly less under common-law arrangements than under administrative processes. The primary implication for environmental policy is that increased reliance on competitive market processes and the common law in copying with externality problems may be more effective than attempts to improve current administrative approaches.
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ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/BF00118647