Conceptual Equivocation and Epistemic Relevance

• Published in: Dialectica Vol. 63; no. 2; pp. 117 - 132
• Main Author: Gerken, Mikkel
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.06.2009; Blackwell
• Subjects: Actuality; Dialectic; Epistemology; Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge; Equivocation; Externalism; Memory; Philosophy; Reason; Reasoning; Relevant alternatives; Self knowledge
• ISSN: 0012-2017; 1746-8361
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01169.x

Much debate has surrounded "switching" scenarios in which a subject's reasoning is said to exhibit the fallacy of equivocation (Burge 1988; Boghossian 1992, 1994). Peter Ludlow has argued that such scenarios are "epistemically prevalent" and, therefore, epistemically relevant alternatives (Ludlow 1995a). Since a distinctive feature of the cases in question is that the subject blamelessly engages in conceptual equivocation, we may label them 'equivocational switching cases'. Ludlow's influential argument occurs in a discussion about compatibilism with regards to anti-individualism (or content externalism) and self-knowledge. However, the issue has wide-reaching consequences for many areas of epistemology. Arguably, the claim that equivocational switching cases are epistemically relevant may bear on the epistemology of inference, testimony, memory, group rationality and belief revision. Ludlow's argument proceeds from a now well-known "down to Earth" switching-case of a subject, Biff, who travels between the US and the UK. I argue that Ludlow's case-based argument fails to support the general claim that conceptual equivocational switching cases are prevalent and epistemically relevant. Thus, the discussion addresses the basis of some poorly understood issues regarding the epistemological consequences of anti-individualism. Simultaneously, the discussion is broadened from the narrow focus on self-knowledge. Finally, the critical discussion serves as the basis for some general reflections on epistemic relevance and the epistemic risks associated with conceptual equivocation. Specifically, I suggest that philosophy is an area where the risk of conceptual equivocation is extraordinarily high.