Hume as a trope nominalist

In this paper, I argue that Hume's solution to a problem that contemporary metaphysicians call "the problem of universals" would be rather trope-theoretical than some other type of nominalism. The basic idea in different trope theories is that particular properties, i.e., tropes are p...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inCanadian journal of philosophy Vol. 42; no. S1; pp. 55 - 66
Main Author Hakkarainen, Jani
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Edmonton Routledge 31.12.2012
Taylor & Francis
Cambridge University Press
Subjects
David Hume
Hume, David (1711-1776)
ideas
metaphysics
nominalism
Rhetorical figures
Tropes
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Summary:In this paper, I argue that Hume's solution to a problem that contemporary metaphysicians call "the problem of universals" would be rather trope-theoretical than some other type of nominalism. The basic idea in different trope theories is that particular properties, i.e., tropes are postulated to account for the fact that there are particular beings resembling each other. I show that Hume's simple sensible perceptions are tropes: simple qualities. Accordingly, their similarities are explained by these tropes themselves and their resemblance. Reading Hume as a trope nominalist sheds light on his account of general ideas, perceptions, relations and nominalism.
ISSN:0045-5091
1911-0820
DOI:10.1080/00455091.2012.972129