Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?

• Published in: International studies quarterly Vol. 40; no. 2; pp. 209 - 233
• Main Authors: Feaver, Peter D., Emerson M. S. Niou
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Guildford, U.K Blackwell Publishers 01.06.1996; Butterworth Scientific Ltd; Blackwell Publishing Ltd
• Subjects: ARMED FORCES AND POLICE; Arms control; Arms race; Bilateral relations; Decision making models; Foreign Affairs; Foreign policy making; Hostility; International relations; International security; Management; NORTH KOREA; Nuclear deterrence; Nuclear diplomacy; Nuclear non-proliferation; Nuclear nonproliferation; Nuclear Proliferation; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; Preemptive strikes; REGIMES; Risk aversion; Risk aversion preference; Security studies; Superpowers; SUPERPOWERS, SUPERPOWER RELATIONS; Treaties; U.S.A; UNITED STATES, 1945 TO PRESENT; War; Weapons; United States; US; North Korea
• ISSN: 0020-8833; 1468-2478
• DOI: 10.2307/2600957

The nonproliferation regime, which denies countries access to critical materials, makes it more likely that defiant proliferators will develop unsafe arsenals. In order to manage proliferation, the U.S. could continue to uphold the regime, hoping to persuade the proliferator to return to non-nuclear status. It could attack, thereby ensuring that the proliferator is unable to join the nuclear club. Or it could concede the nonproliferation goal and render assistance to address the attendant safety concerns. Through a series of deductive models we argue that three factors are important in determining the right option: (1) U.S. preferences on proliferation, whether purist or pragmatist; (2) the proliferator's type, which can vary by size, affinity, and risk tolerance; and (3) the phase in the proliferation process to which the proliferator has advanced: preweaponization, after weaponization but before deployment, the deployment phase, and, finally, full deployment. We analyze the special case of proliferation by a small enemy of the United States such as North Korea as a signaling game wherein each side attempts to push the outcome toward its own preferred equilibrium. The North Koreans prefer the equilibrium in which the United States never attacks regardless of its type, whereas the United States prefers the equilibrium in which North Korea never deploys regardless of its type.