Investor ideology

We estimate institutional investor preferences from proxy voting records. The W-NOMINATE method maps investors onto a left-right dimension based on votes for fiscal year 2012. Public pension funds and other investors on the left support a more social and environment-friendly orientation of the firm...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of financial economics Vol. 137; no. 2; pp. 320 - 352
Main Authors Bolton, Patrick, Li, Tao, Ravina, Enrichetta, Rosenthal, Howard
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.08.2020
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
Subjects
Advisors
Compensation
Executive compensation
Governance
Ideology
Institutional investments
Institutional investors
Investors
Money
Mutual funds
Pension funds
Preferences
Proxies
Proxy voting
Spatial model
Voting
Proxy voting
G30
Ideology
G23
C80
Spatial model
Institutional investors
D72
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:We estimate institutional investor preferences from proxy voting records. The W-NOMINATE method maps investors onto a left-right dimension based on votes for fiscal year 2012. Public pension funds and other investors on the left support a more social and environment-friendly orientation of the firm and fewer executive compensation proposals. “Money-conscious” investors appear on the right. The proxy advisor ISS makes voting recommendations that place it center, to the left of most large mutual funds. A second dimension reflects a more traditional governance view, with management-disciplinarian investors, the proxy advisor Glass Lewis among them, pitted against more management-friendly ones.
ISSN:0304-405X
1879-2774
DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.03.004