The new Norwegian incentive system for publication: from bad to worse

The new Norwegian system for calculation of publication credits is examined. The new system was launched due to criticism for penalizing collaborative research. It turns out that adverse incentive problems emerge as a result of this system change. We show by a simple case, that institutions will ben...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inScientometrics Vol. 109; no. 2; pp. 1299 - 1306
Main Authors Haugen, Kjetil K., Sandnes, Frode E.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.11.2016
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Computer Science
Incentives
Information Storage and Retrieval
Institutions
Library Science
I21
Research
Reward system
Norway
Adverse incentive effects
I28
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Summary:The new Norwegian system for calculation of publication credits is examined. The new system was launched due to criticism for penalizing collaborative research. It turns out that adverse incentive problems emerge as a result of this system change. We show by a simple case, that institutions will benefit (credit-wise) by adding more authors to a scientific publication. Even worse, the beneficial effect increases the more authors the paper has initially. Alternative cases indicate even stronger incentives for co-author maximization.
ISSN:0138-9130
1588-2861
DOI:10.1007/s11192-016-2075-2