The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism
This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about 'knows'. I arg...
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Published in | Erkenntnis Vol. 78; no. 4; pp. 899 - 919 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Dordrecht
Springer
01.08.2013
Springer Netherlands Springer Nature B.V |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about 'knows'. I argue that practical pressures that arise in an epistemic state of nature provide an explanatory basis for a brand of contextualism that I call 'practical interests contextualism'. I also answer some questions that contextualism leaves open, particularly why the concept of knowledge is valuable, why the word 'knows' exhibits context-variability, and why this term enjoys such widespread use. Finally, I show how my contextualist framework accommodates plausible ideas from two rival views: subject-sensitive invariantism and insensitive invariantism. This provides new support for contextualism and develops this view in a way that improves our understanding of the concept of knowledge. |
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Bibliography: | SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0165-0106 1572-8420 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s10670-012-9426-z |