Is Earnings Quality Associated with Corporate Social Responsibility?

This study examines whether socially responsible firms behave differently from other firms in their financial reporting. Specifically, we question whether firms that exhibit corporate social responsibility (CSR) also behave in a responsible manner to constrain earnings management, thereby delivering...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Accounting review Vol. 87; no. 3; pp. 761 - 796
Main Authors Kim, Yongtae, Park, Myung Seok, Wier, Benson
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Sarasota American Accounting Association 01.05.2012
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
More Information
Summary:This study examines whether socially responsible firms behave differently from other firms in their financial reporting. Specifically, we question whether firms that exhibit corporate social responsibility (CSR) also behave in a responsible manner to constrain earnings management, thereby delivering more transparent and reliable financial information to investors as compared to firms that do not meet the same social criteria. We find that socially responsible firms are less likely (1) to manage earnings through discretionary accruals, (2) to manipulate real operating activities, and (3) to be the subject of SEC investigations, as evidenced by Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases against top executives. Our results are robust to (1) controlling for various incentives for CSR and earnings management, (2) considering various CSR dimensions and components, and (3) using alternative proxies for CSR and accruals quality. To the extent that we control for the potential effects of reputation and financial performance, our findings suggest that ethical concerns are likely to drive managers to produce high-quality financial reports.
Bibliography:SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
ObjectType-Article-2
content type line 23
ISSN:0001-4826
1558-7967
DOI:10.2308/accr-10209