On the timing of information release

We consider a simple principal-agent model in which moral hazard concerns can make it attractive to delay the release of valuable planning information. We also demonstrate that temporary manipulation of the content of the information released can be valuable.

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInformation economics and policy Vol. 2; no. 4; pp. 307 - 316
Main Authors Demski, Joel S., Sappington, David E.M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.12.1986
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesInformation Economics and Policy
Subjects
Economic impact
Effizienz
incentives
Information
information delay
Information management
information release
moral hazard
Release
Studies
Timing
timing of announcements
information release
incentives
moral hazard
Information
information delay
timing of announcements
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Summary:We consider a simple principal-agent model in which moral hazard concerns can make it attractive to delay the release of valuable planning information. We also demonstrate that temporary manipulation of the content of the information released can be valuable.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
content type line 14
ISSN:0167-6245
1873-5975
DOI:10.1016/0167-6245(86)90005-3