Critical Thinking, Autonomy and Practical Reason

• Published in: Journal of philosophy of education Vol. 38; no. 1; pp. 75 - 90
• Main Author: Cuypers, Stefaan E.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing 01.02.2004; Blackwell
• Subjects: Critical Thinking; Educational Philosophy; Educational sciences; History and philosophy of education; Philosophy of education; Teaching Methods; Thinking Skills; Kant (E.); Education philosophy; Autonomy; Critical analysis; Theory; Rationality
• ISSN: 0309-8249; 1467-9752
• DOI: 10.1111/j.0309-8249.2004.00364.x

This article points out an internal tension, or even conflict, in the conceptual foundations of Harvey Siegel's conception of critical thinking. Siegel justifies critical thinking, or critically rational autonomy, as an educational ideal first and foremost by an appeal to the Kantian principle of respect for persons. It is made explicit that this fundamental moral principle is ultimately grounded in the Kantian conception of autonomous practical reason as normatively and motivationally robust. Yet this Kantian conception openly conflicts with Siegel's own two‐component theory of critical thinking, which on close inspection turns out to be a version of the Humean conception of instrumental practical reason as normatively and motivationally powerless. It is concluded that Siegel cannot have it both ways: he cannot appeal both to means‐end and to robust rationality. Siegel's Kantian justification of the critical thinking educational ideal is, therefore, found wanting in terms of his own Humean premises.