A review of likelihood ratios in forensic science based on a critique of Stiffelman “No longer the Gold standard: Probabilistic genotyping is changing the nature of DNA evidence in criminal trials”

• Published in: Forensic science international Vol. 310; p. 110251
• Main Authors: Buckleton, John, Robertson, Bernard, Curran, James, Berger, Charles, Taylor, Duncan, Bright, Jo-Anne, Hicks, Tacha, Gittelson, Simone, Evett, Ian, Pugh, Simone, Jackson, Graham, Kelly, Hannah, Kalafut, Tim, Bieber, Frederick R.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Ireland Elsevier B.V 01.05.2020; Elsevier Limited
• Subjects: Bayesian analysis; Conditional probability; Convictions; Crime; Deoxyribonucleic acid; DNA; Exhaustiveness; Federal Rules of Evidence; Forensic science; Forensic sciences; Genetic testing; Genotyping; Hypotheses; Likelihood ratio; Presumption of innocence; Probability; Reasonable doubt; Scientists; Software; Statistical analysis; Trials; Likelihood ratio; Presumption of innocence; Exhaustiveness; Reasonable doubt
• ISSN: 0379-0738; 1872-6283
• DOI: 10.1016/j.forsciint.2020.110251

•Recent criticism reprises some objections to the use of LRs in forensic science.•We find that LRs do not infringe the ultimate issue.•LRs do not change the beyond reasonable doubt standard.•LRs do not infringe the presumption of innocence.•Propositions should be exhaustive in the context of the case. Stiffelman [1] gives a broad critique of the application of likelihood ratios (LRs) in forensic science, in particular their use in probabilistic genotyping (PG) software. These are discussed in this review. LRs do not infringe on the ultimate issue. The Bayesian paradigm clearly separates the role of the scientist from that of the decision makers and distances the scientist from comment on the ultimate and subsidiary issues. LRs do not affect the reasonable doubt standard. Fact finders must still make decisions based on all the evidence and they must do this considering all evidence, not just that given probabilistically. LRs do not infringe on the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence does not equate with a prior probability of zero but simply that the person of interest (POI) is no more likely than anyone else to be the donor. Propositions need to be exhaustive within the context of the case. That is, propositions deemed relevant by either defense or prosecution which are not fanciful must not be omitted from consideration.