Group preference aggregation in the multiplicative AHP The model of the group decision process and Pareto optimality

A recent paper has focused awareness on group aggregation procedures in the AHP, showing that geometric mean aggregation violates the desirable social choice axiom of Pareto optimality. We show that this violation can be attributed to the representation used to model the group decision process, ther...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEuropean journal of operational research Vol. 96; no. 2; pp. 363 - 370
Main Authors Van Den Honert, R.C., Lootsma, F.A.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 24.01.1997
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Subjects
Analytic hierarchy process
Decision analysis
Group aggregation
Hierarchies
Operations research
Pareto optimality
Pareto optimum
Studies
Group aggregation
Pareto optimality
Decision analysis
Analytic hierarchy process
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Summary:A recent paper has focused awareness on group aggregation procedures in the AHP, showing that geometric mean aggregation violates the desirable social choice axiom of Pareto optimality. We show that this violation can be attributed to the representation used to model the group decision process, thereby questioning the legitimacy of the Pareto optimality axiom. We furthermore propose a geometric mean group aggregation procedure which satisfies all the social choice axioms suggested.
ISSN:0377-2217
1872-6860
DOI:10.1016/0377-2217(95)00345-2