Uniqueness of Nash equilibria in a quantum Cournot duopoly game

A quantum Cournot game whose classical form game has multiple Nash equilibria is examined. Although the classical equilibria fail to be Pareto optimal, the quantum equilibrium exhibits the following two properties: (i) if the measurement of entanglement between strategic variables chosen by the comp...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of physics. A, Mathematical and theoretical Vol. 43; no. 14; p. 145303
Main Authors Sekiguchi, Yohei, Sakahara, Kiri, Sato, Takashi
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Bristol IOP Publishing 09.04.2010
IOP
Subjects
Entanglement
Exact sciences and technology
Games
Mathematical analysis
Mathematical models
Optimization
Pareto optimality
Physics
Uniqueness
Quantum entanglement
Quantum game
Multiple equilibrium
Multiplicity
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Summary:A quantum Cournot game whose classical form game has multiple Nash equilibria is examined. Although the classical equilibria fail to be Pareto optimal, the quantum equilibrium exhibits the following two properties: (i) if the measurement of entanglement between strategic variables chosen by the competing firms is sufficiently large, the multiplicity of equilibria vanishes, and (ii) the more strongly the strategic variables are entangled, the more closely the unique equilibrium approaches to the optimal one.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:1751-8121
1751-8113
1751-8121
DOI:10.1088/1751-8113/43/14/145303