PLAY IT AGAIN: PARTNER CHOICE, REPUTATION BUILDING AND LEARNING FROM FINITELY REPEATED DILEMMA GAMES

Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to 'wipe clean' one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of ba...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Economic journal (London) Vol. 127; no. 602; pp. 1069 - 1095
Main Authors Kamei, Kenju, Putterman, Louis
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published John Wiley & Sons Ltd 01.06.2017
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to 'wipe clean' one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their 'reforming' themselves. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with endogenous, symmetric partner choice. We find that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts, although earlier end-game behaviour is observed.
ISSN:0013-0133
1468-0297
DOI:10.1111/ecoj.12320