The Accountability Effects of Political Institutions and Capitalism on Interstate Conflict

Selectorate theory posits that leader accountability increases with the size of the winning coalition. Recent research contends that capitalism also increases leader accountability because leaders are more dependent on the public for revenue in more capitalist economies. The authors argue that extan...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Journal of conflict resolution Vol. 54; no. 4; pp. 543 - 565
Main Authors Anderson, Sally, Souva, Mark
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Los Angeles, CA Sage Publications 01.08.2010
SAGE Publications
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
Subjects
Accountability
Armed forces
Balance of power
Capital market theory
Capitalism
Capitalist peace
Coalitions
Conflict
Conflict resolution
Conflict theory
Democracy
Democratic peace
Democratic theory
Disputes
Dyadic relations
Empirical tests
Foreign policy
International conflicts
Interstate conflict
Leaders
Leadership
Peace
Political Institutions
Political leadership
Political systems
Probability calculus
Research design
Revenue
Selectorate theory
Social Systems
Theory
democratic peace
selectorate theory
capitalist peace
conflict
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Summary:Selectorate theory posits that leader accountability increases with the size of the winning coalition. Recent research contends that capitalism also increases leader accountability because leaders are more dependent on the public for revenue in more capitalist economies. The authors argue that extant tests of accountability arguments of interstate conflict initiation and targeting are flawed. Accountability theories of foreign policy expect leaders to selectively initiate disputes based on their probability of winning. Accountability arguments, then, expect a conditional relationship between the accountability mechanism and the balance of power. For example, if capitalism produces peace through accountability, then more capitalist states should be less likely to initiate militarized disputes as their power advantage decreases. The authors find that this is not the case. At the same time, the authors find robust support for selectorate theory's contention that larger winning coalitions are more selective about using military force. Political institutions induce accountability; capitalism does not.
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ISSN:0022-0027
1552-8766
DOI:10.1177/0022002710370134