Canada, Strategic Defence, and Strategic Stability: A Retrospective and Look Ahead

• Published in: International journal (Toronto) Vol. 63; no. 4; pp. 917 - 937
• Main Author: Lagasse, Philippe
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: London, England Canadian International Council 22.09.2008; SAGE Publications; Sage Publications Ltd. (UK); Sage Publications Ltd
• Subjects: Advocacy; Air defense; Arms control & disarmament; Arms control agreements; Ballistic missiles; Canada; Cold War; Defense industry; Defense policy; Futility; Government; International relations; Liberalism; Military policy; Military Strategy; Military weapons; Missile defense; National security; Nuclear Weapons; Politics; Stability; Strategic Defense Initiative; Warnings; Canada; United States > US
• ISSN: 0020-7020; 2052-465X
• DOI: 10.1177/002070200806300407

Canada has contributed to North American strategic defence, and been an ardent proponent of strategic stability, since the early Cold War. Though seemingly compatible, Canada's involvement in continental strategic defence and advocacy of strategic stability has been nagged by an underlying contradiction. As part of its contribution to the strategic defence of the continent, Canada has tacitly endorsed and facilitated the United States' offensively oriented nuclear strategies. Canada's support of strategic stability, however, has aimed to discourage offensive nuclear doctrines and the arms races they have tended to fuel. Given this contradiction, Ottawa might have decided to harmonize its policies, either by abandoning strategic defence roles that have supported offensive American nuclear doctrines, or by ceasing to be an advocate of strategic stability and strategic arms control. But this has not been the path chosen by successive Canadian government since the mid-1960s. Instead, Canadian governments have opted to accept the contradiction and pursue a two-track approach: for more than four decades, Canada has contributed to continental strategic defences that have aided offensively oriented nuclear strategies, while simultaneously vaunting the value of strategic stability and strategic arms control. Following this two-track approach has served Canadian governments well. It allowed Ottawa to protect Canada and Canadians by emphasizing the futility of nuclear war and arms races. Yet it further permitted the Canadian military to assist the United States in defending North America and in maintaining a credible nuclear weapons posture, one capable of prevailing over common adversaries during a conflict. Since each of these policies and outcomes served the Canadian national interest, Ottawa was determined to avoid developments that exposed the contradictory nature of the two tracks, or that pushed Canada to choose between its commitment to strategic defence and its advocacy of strategic stability. Canadian governments have managed to conceal this contradiction and avoid making such a choice for most of the past four decades. However, there has been one technological development, ballistic missile defence, that has routinely threatened to expose the contradiction and force Ottawa to give precedence to strategic defence over strategic stability, or vice versa. Nonetheless, in spite of the pressure exerted by BMD, Canadian governments preserved the two- track approach; the missile defence issue has not compelled Ottawa to downgrade either its existing commitments to strategic defence or its support of strategic stability and arms control. A question that remains is whether future Canadian governments will be able to preserve this dual approach when the missile defence issue arises again, which is likely to happen within the next few years. This article examines the history and future of Canada's involvement in the strategic defence of North America and advocacy of strategic stability. It begins with an overview of Canada's strategic defence and stability policies during the Cold War and post- Cold War eras, with a particular focus on the politics surrounding Canadian participation in BMD. Next, it analyzes how the government's decision to decline a formal role in BMD in 2005 represented a reapplication of the two-track approach. It concludes with a discussion of the strategic defence and stability options a future Canadian government is likely to face.