Constructivism: Sound theory for explicating the practice of science and science teaching

Critics praise applications of constructivism in science pedagogy, but they argue that constructivism is severely impaired and hopelessly flawed as a theory. Flawed theory should not be employed to explain innovative practice. My purposes are twofold. First and foremost, I present a case to support...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of research in science teaching Vol. 35; no. 5; pp. 501 - 520
Main Author Staver, John R.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company 01.05.1998
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
More Information
Summary:Critics praise applications of constructivism in science pedagogy, but they argue that constructivism is severely impaired and hopelessly flawed as a theory. Flawed theory should not be employed to explain innovative practice. My purposes are twofold. First and foremost, I present a case to support my own and others' assertions that constructivism is a sound theory with which to explain the practice of science and science pedagogy. In accomplishing my primary purpose, I also fulfill my secondary purpose, to respond to constructivism's critics. My argument is presented in three parts. In Part 1, I delineate the epistemological ground with a brief synopsis of the purpose, nature, and orientation of radical and social constructivism. I then offer a synthesis of their foundations. In Part 2, I offer a constructivist account of five long‐standing epistemological issues, including truth, solipsism, experience, instrumentalism, and relativity. Truth is the center piece of the argument, and I show how constructivism avoids the root paradox by embracing truth as coherence. Next, constructivism is shown to be a rejection of solipsism. Then, an account of experience based in neurophysiological theory, emergent properties, and the brain as a parallel data‐processing organ is provided to support constructivism's inside‐out view of experience, in which meaning making occurs within individual minds and in communities of individuals. In the final segment of Part 2, I present a constructivist account of relativity which focuses on physicists' acceptance of relativity, its translation to constructivist epistemology, and constructivists' request for silence regarding ontology. Response to critics' objections are also presented at appropriate points throughout Part 2. In the third part, I present constructivism as an epistemological foundation for a cybernetic perspective of knowing. I then summarize the value of constructivism in explaining and interpreting the practice of science and science pedagogy. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. J Res Sci Teach 35: 501–520, 1998.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-65TTWT9B-C
istex:A92A4FA5A0A17AE57D3EDAACBED9A866C3A79921
ArticleID:TEA3
ISSN:0022-4308
1098-2736
DOI:10.1002/(SICI)1098-2736(199805)35:5<501::AID-TEA3>3.0.CO;2-T