Attracting Creativity: The Initial and Aggregate Effects of Contract Selection on Creativity-Weighted Productivity

• Published in: The Accounting review Vol. 85; no. 5; pp. 1669 - 1691
• Main Authors: Kachelmeier, Steven J., Williamson, Michael G.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Sarasota American Accounting Association 01.09.2010
• Subjects: Aggregate production; Applied economics; Average product; Commercial production; Creativity; Enterprises; Finance; Financial performance; Heuristics; Management accounting; Participant observation; Pay for performance; Payments; Productivity; Research universities; Studies; Wage payment systems
• ISSN: 0001-4826; 1558-7967
• DOI: 10.2308/accr.2010.85.5.1669

Performance-based compensation contracts can affect productivity both by motivating effort and by attracting workers whose abilities align best with the offered contracts. Using an experiment in which participants design "rebus puzzles," this study tests whether the incremental benefits of contract self-selection extend to a multi-dimensional performance environment in which participants choose between a contract that rewards both quantity and creativity versus a contract that rewards quantity only. Findings indicate that participants who choose a creativity-weighted pay scheme perceive themselves to have greater creative potential than those who choose a quantity-only scheme. This perceived creativity advantage manifests itself in the superior initial creativity ratings of such participants' productive output. However, in the aggregate, participants paid only for quantity eventually surpass the creativity-weighted productivity scores of participants paid for creativity-weighted productivity, whether compensation contracts are self-selected or randomly assigned. Thus, the implications of contract selection on creativity-weighted productivity hinge on the importance of the initial advantage enjoyed by participants who self-select a creativity-weighted contract.