An Iterated Projection Approach to Variational Problems Under Generalized Convexity Constraints
The principal-agent problem in economics leads to variational problems subject to global constraints of b -convexity on the admissible functions, capturing the so-called incentive-compatibility constraints. Typical examples are minimization problems subject to a convexity constraint. In a recent pat...
Saved in:
Published in | Applied mathematics & optimization Vol. 76; no. 3; pp. 565 - 592 |
---|---|
Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
New York
Springer US
01.12.2017
Springer Nature B.V Springer Verlag (Germany) |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
Summary: | The principal-agent problem in economics leads to variational problems subject to global constraints of
b
-convexity on the admissible functions, capturing the so-called incentive-compatibility constraints. Typical examples are minimization problems subject to a convexity constraint. In a recent pathbreaking article, Figalli et al. (J Econ Theory 146(2):454–478,
2011
) identified conditions which ensure convexity of the principal-agent problem and thus raised hope on the development of numerical methods. We consider special instances of projections problems over
b
-convex functions and show how they can be solved numerically using Dykstra’s iterated projection algorithm to handle the
b
-convexity constraint in the framework of (Figalli et al. in J Econ Theory 146(2):454–478,
2011
). Our method also turns out to be simple for convex envelope computations. |
---|---|
Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 |
ISSN: | 0095-4616 1432-0606 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00245-016-9361-5 |