Curb Your Embodiment

• Published in: Topics in cognitive science Vol. 10; no. 3; pp. 501 - 517
• Main Author: Pecher, Diane
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: United States Wiley Subscription Services, Inc 01.07.2018
• Subjects: Abstract concepts; Action simulation; Conceptual metaphor; Grounding cognition; Situated cognition; Situated cognition; Conceptual metaphor; Grounding cognition; Action simulation; Abstract concepts
• ISSN: 1756-8757; 1756-8765
• DOI: 10.1111/tops.12311

To explain how concepts are grounded in sensory‐motor experiences, several theories have been proposed. I will discuss two of these proposals, Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Situated Cognition, and argue why they do not fully explain grounding. A central idea in Conceptual Metaphor Theory is that image schemas ground concepts in concrete experiences. Image schemas might themselves be ions, however, and therefore do not solve the grounding problem. Moreover, image schemas are too simple to explain the full richness of concepts. Situated cognition might provide such richness. Research in our laboratory, however, has shown that even for concrete concepts, sensory‐motor grounding is task dependent. Therefore, it is questionable whether concepts can be significantly grounded in sensory‐motor processing. The involvement of the sensorimotor system for the processing and representation of concepts is challenged. Pecher reviews two theoretical accounts that support the grounding of concepts in perception and action: Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 1999) and Situated Cognition account (Barsalou & Wiemer‐Hastings, 2005; Barsalou, 2015). The author argues that neither of these two accounts can fully explain concepts’ grounding.