Stackelberg game-based precoding and power allocation for spectrum auction in fractional frequency reuse cognitive cellular systems
Spectrum auction has been considered as a promising approach to effectively reallocate spectrum resources in the secondary spectrum market. In our previous work, spectrum auction in a fractional frequency reuse (FFR) cognitive cellular system was studied. However, the bidding and valuation model of...
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Published in | EURASIP journal on wireless communications and networking Vol. 2016; no. 1; pp. 1 - 11 |
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Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Cham
Springer International Publishing
05.09.2016
Springer Nature B.V |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Spectrum auction has been considered as a promising approach to effectively reallocate spectrum resources in the secondary spectrum market. In our previous work, spectrum auction in a fractional frequency reuse (FFR) cognitive cellular system was studied. However, the bidding and valuation model of secondary users (SUs) are not close to practical applications as they introduced a random value of a fixed scope. In this paper, through an optimal interference price announced by the primary user (PU), a joint precoding and power allocation algorithm via Stackelberg game (OIPPS) is proposed to improve the spectrum auction problem subject to the interference constraint of PU, the transmission power constraint of SUs, and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) constraint of each SU in the FFR cognitive cellular system. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed OIPPS algorithm in terms of the convergence of precoding and power allocation vectors and the maximized sum utility of SUs while taking full consideration of the PU’s revenue. Besides, a comparison between the bidding improved spectrum auction scheme and a traditional method is proposed to show the effectiveness of our proposed algorithm. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 1687-1499 1687-1472 1687-1499 |
DOI: | 10.1186/s13638-016-0712-3 |