CEO Tenure and R&D Investment The Moderating Effect of Board Capital

This study examines the curvilinear CEO tenure–R&D investment relationship and the moderating influence of board capital on this relationship, thus making two major contributions. First, the finding of an inverted-U CEO tenure–R&D investment relationship enriches our understanding of how the...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Journal of applied behavioral science Vol. 49; no. 4; pp. 437 - 459
Main Author Chen, Hsiang-Lan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Los Angeles, CA SAGE Publications 01.12.2013
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
More Information
Summary:This study examines the curvilinear CEO tenure–R&D investment relationship and the moderating influence of board capital on this relationship, thus making two major contributions. First, the finding of an inverted-U CEO tenure–R&D investment relationship enriches our understanding of how the CEO life cycle affects corporate investment decisions, particularly R&D. Second, the evidence of positive moderating effects of board human and social capital suggests that boards affect managerial choices through their human and social capital, thereby providing insight into how boards influence CEOs’ decision-making capabilities and, consequently, their R&D investment decisions. One important implication is that to encourage CEOs to invest in R&D, shareholders in the electronics industry and firms competing in innovation through R&D spending may consider appointing more directors with greater human and social capital to the Board because they will provide CEOs with ongoing advice and essential resources for R&D. The implications for strategy consultants are also discussed.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ObjectType-Article-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
ISSN:0021-8863
1552-6879
DOI:10.1177/0021886313485129