User-Centric Key Entropy: Study of Biometric Key Derivation Subject to Spoofing Attacks

• Published in: Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) Vol. 19; no. 2; p. 70
• Main Authors: Dinca, Lavinia, Hancke, Gerhard
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Basel MDPI AG 01.02.2017
• Subjects: biometric entropy; biometric PKI; Biometrics; Communication systems; Entropy; Fuzzy; multi-modal key derivation; Security; Spoofing; Systems analysis; user-centric security; Vulnerability; Wireless Sensor Security
• ISSN: 1099-4300; 1099-4300
• DOI: 10.3390/e19020070

Biometric data can be used as input for PKI key pair generation. The concept of not saving the private key is very appealing, but the implementation of such a system shouldn’t be rushed because it might prove less secure then current PKI infrastructure. One biometric characteristic can be easily spoofed, so it was believed that multi-modal biometrics would offer more security, because spoofing two or more biometrics would be very hard. This notion, of increased security of multi-modal biometric systems, was disproved for authentication and matching, studies showing that not only multi-modal biometric systems are not more secure, but they introduce additional vulnerabilities. This paper is a study on the implications of spoofing biometric data for retrieving the derived key. We demonstrate that spoofed biometrics can yield the same key, which in turn will lead an attacker to obtain the private key. A practical implementation is proposed using fingerprint and iris as biometrics and the fuzzy extractor for biometric key extraction. Our experiments show what happens when the biometric data is spoofed for both uni-modal systems and multi-modal. In case of multi-modal system tests were performed when spoofing one biometric or both. We provide detailed analysis of every scenario in regard to successful tests and overall key entropy. Our paper defines a biometric PKI scenario and an in depth security analysis for it. The analysis can be viewed as a blueprint for implementations of future similar systems, because it highlights the main security vulnerabilities for bioPKI. The analysis is not constrained to the biometric part of the system, but covers CA security, sensor security, communication interception, RSA encryption vulnerabilities regarding key entropy, and much more.