Knowing That P without Believing That P
Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not fin...
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| Published in | Noûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Vol. 47; no. 2; pp. 371 - 384 |
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| Main Authors | , |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Malden, MA
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
01.06.2013
Wiley-Blackwell |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
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| Abstract | Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical. |
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| AbstractList | Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without--or at least without determinately--believing that P. Accordingly, we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P . Accordingly, we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical. Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical. |
| Author | Schwitzgebel, Eric Myers-Schulz, Blake |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Blake surname: Myers-Schulz fullname: Myers-Schulz, Blake organization: University of Wisconsin at Madison – sequence: 2 givenname: Eric surname: Schwitzgebel fullname: Schwitzgebel, Eric organization: University of California at Riverside |
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| Cites_doi | 10.1016/S0959-4752(97)00004-2 10.1080/00048409612347521 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00958.x 10.2307/2183013 10.2307/2025439 10.1093/analys/31.5.152 10.1093/aristotelian/70.1.21 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00758.x 10.1111/1468-0068.00370 10.1093/analys/29.6.207 10.1093/analys/42.4.212 10.2307/2678403 10.1007/s11251-007-9038-1 10.2307/2025831 10.1093/aristotelian/53.1.151 10.2307/2220194 10.5840/jphil20081051025 10.2307/3326979 10.1111/1467-9213.00215 10.1017/CBO9780511570827 10.1007/BF00372453 10.1093/analys/27.1.11 10.1016/j.learninstruc.2006.09.006 10.1007/978-1-349-15442-5 10.2307/2219714 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238089.001.0001 10.1093/0195130057.003.0002 10.3102/00028312032002413 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01381.x |
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| Copyright | Copyright © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 2015 INIST-CNRS Copyright 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. |
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| References | Hamlyn, D.W. (1970). Theory of Knowledge. Garden City: Anchor Books. Harker, J.E. (1980). "A Note on Believing That One Knows and Lehrer's Proof That Knowledge Entails Belief," Philosophical Studies, 37, 321-324. Gendler, T.S. (2008). "Alief and Belief," Journal of Philosophy, 105, 634-663. Alexander, P.A., & Dochy, F.J.R.C. (1995). "Conceptions of Knowledge and Beliefs: A Comparison across Varying Cultural and Educational Communities," American Educational Research Journal, 32, 413-442. Schwitzgebel, E. (2001a). "In-Between Believing," Philosophical Quarterly, 51, 76-82. Price, H.H. (1969). Belief. London: Allen & Unwin. Radford, C. (1966). "Knowledge-By Examples," Analysis, 27, 1-11. Dartnall, T. (1986). "Radford Revisited," The Philosophical Quarterly, 36, 395-398. Stanley, J. (2011). "Knowing (How)," Noûs, 47, 207-238. O'Neill, E. (1918). Where the Cross Is Made, reprinted in The Plays of Eugene O'Neill, vol. 12. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (1935). 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| References_xml | – reference: Hamlyn, D.W. (1970). Theory of Knowledge. Garden City: Anchor Books. – reference: Harker, J.E. (1980). "A Note on Believing That One Knows and Lehrer's Proof That Knowledge Entails Belief," Philosophical Studies, 37, 321-324. – reference: Margolis, J. (1973). Knowledge and Existence. New York: Oxford University Press. – reference: Hurlburt, R.T., & Schwitzgebel, E. (2011). "Presuppositions and Background Assumptions," Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18 (1), 206-233. – reference: McGeer, V., & Schwitzgebel, E. (2006). "Disorder in the Representational Warehouse," Child Development, 17, 1557-1562. – reference: Price, H.H. (1969). Belief. London: Allen & Unwin. – reference: Currie, G., & Ravenscroft, I. (2002). Recreative Minds. Oxford: Clarendon Press. – reference: Woozley, A.D. (1953). "Knowing and Not Knowing," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 53, 151-172. – reference: Armstrong, D.M. (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – reference: Schwitzgebel, E. (2010). "Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs, or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91, 531-553. – reference: Sorensen, R. (1982). "Knowing, Believing, and Guessing," Analysis, 42, 212-213. – reference: Maggioni, L., Riconscente, M.M., & Aleander, P.A. (2006). "Perceptions of Knowledge and Beliefs among Undergraduate Students in Italy and the United States," Learning and Instruction, 16, 467-491. – reference: O'Neill, E. (1918). Where the Cross Is Made, reprinted in The Plays of Eugene O'Neill, vol. 12. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (1935). – reference: Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson. – reference: Boldrin, A., & Mason, L. (2009). "Distinguishing Between Knowledge and Beliefs: Students' Epistemic Criteria for Differentiating," Instructional Science, 37, 107-127. – reference: Alexander, P.A., & Dochy, F.J.R.C. (1995). "Conceptions of Knowledge and Beliefs: A Comparison across Varying Cultural and Educational Communities," American Educational Research Journal, 32, 413-442. – reference: Gendler, T.S. (2008). "Alief and Belief," Journal of Philosophy, 105, 634-663. – reference: Cohen, J. (1966). "More about Knowing and Feeling Sure," Analysis, 27, 11-16. – reference: Schwitzgebel, E. (2001a). "In-Between Believing," Philosophical Quarterly, 51, 76-82. – reference: Feldman, R. (2003). Epistemology. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall (Foundations of Philosophy Series). – reference: Radford, C. (1988). "Radford Revisiting," The Philosophical Quarterly, 38, 496-499. – reference: Walton, K.L. (1978). "Fearing Fictions," Journal of Philosophy, 75, 5-27. – reference: Ring, M. (1977). "Knowledge: The Cessation of Belief," American Philosophical Quarterly, 14, 51-59. – reference: Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford. – reference: Williams, M. (2001). Problems of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford. – reference: Annis, D. (1977). "Knowledge, Belief, and Rationality," The Journal of Philosophy, 74, 217-225. – reference: Annis, D. (1969). "A Note on Lehrer's Proof That Knowledge Entails Belief," Analysis, 29, 207-208. – reference: Cohen, J. (1992). An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. New York: Clarendon Press. – reference: Lehrer, K. (1968). "Belief and Knowledge," The Philosophical Review, 77, 491-499. – reference: Lewis, D. (1996). "Elusive Knowledge," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 549-67. – reference: Armstrong, D.M. (1969). "Does Knowledge Entail Belief?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 70, 21-36. – reference: Dretske, F.I. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: MIT. – reference: Radford, C. (1966). "Knowledge-By Examples," Analysis, 27, 1-11. – reference: Stanley, J., & Williamson, T. (2001). "Knowing How," Journal of Philosophy, 98, 411-444. – reference: Dartnall, T. (1986). "Radford Revisited," The Philosophical Quarterly, 36, 395-398. – reference: Kuhn, T.S. (1962/1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago. – reference: Schwitzgebel, E. (2002). "A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief," Noûs, 36, 249-275. – reference: Alexander, P.A., Murphy, P.K., Guan, J., & Murphy, P.A. (1998). "How Students and Teachers in Singapore and the United States Conceptualize Knowledge and Beliefs: Positioning Learning Within Epistemological Frameworks," Learning and Instruction, 8, 97-116. – reference: Black, C. (1971). "Knowledge without Belief," Analysis, 31, 152-158. – reference: Stanley, J. (2011). "Knowing (How)," Noûs, 47, 207-238. – reference: Audi, R. (1998). Epistemology. 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| Title | Knowing That P without Believing That P |
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