Knowing That P without Believing That P

Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not fin...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inNoûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Vol. 47; no. 2; pp. 371 - 384
Main Authors Myers-Schulz, Blake, Schwitzgebel, Eric
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Malden, MA Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.06.2013
Wiley-Blackwell
Subjects
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Knowledge management
Philosophy
Knowledge theory
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Summary:Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-D106K214-S
istex:3543E8A0F1CAAD8D1A0969203638EE41815538A2
ArticleID:NOUS12022
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
ISSN:0029-4624
1468-0068
DOI:10.1111/nous.12022