Embodied cognition: So flexible as to be “disembodied”?

This review aims to explore what I call the “Embodiment Cost Hypothesis” (ECH), according to which, when humans “embody” a part of the world other than their bodies, a measurable cost is detectable on their real bodies. The review analyzes experimental evidence in favor of the ECH by examining studi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inConsciousness and cognition Vol. 88; p. 103075
Main Author Ianì, Francesco
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published United States Elsevier Inc 01.02.2021
Elsevier BV
Subjects
Body representation
Cognition
Disembodiment
Embodied cognition
Embodiment
Reviews
Tool use
Body representation
Embodied cognition
Embodiment
Disembodiment
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Summary:This review aims to explore what I call the “Embodiment Cost Hypothesis” (ECH), according to which, when humans “embody” a part of the world other than their bodies, a measurable cost is detectable on their real bodies. The review analyzes experimental evidence in favor of the ECH by examining studies from different research fields, including studies of action observation (2), tool-use (3), rubber hand illusion (4), and full-body illusions (5). In light of this literature, this review argues that embodiment effects can profitably be seen as phenomena associated with both benefits (resulting from the embodiment of external objects/bodies) and costs (resulting from the disembodiment at various levels of the subject’s own body). Implications are discussed in relation to the ongoing debate on the embodied cognition (EC) approach.
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ISSN:1053-8100
1090-2376
1090-2376
DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103075