School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation

In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare mech...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe American economic review Vol. 103; no. 1; pp. 80 - 106
Main Authors Pathak, Parag A., Sönmez, Tayfun
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Nashville American Economic Association 01.02.2013
Subjects
Auction markets
Auctions
College admissions
Comparative analysis
Economic models
Economic statistics
Economic theory
Economists
Education reform
Education systems
England
Government policy
High school students
High schools
Illinois
Livestock auctions
Local government
Mechanism design
Methodology
Parents & parenting
Policy analysis
Preferences
Public schools
Reforms
School administration
School admission
School admissions
School choice
School districts
Studies
U.S.A
United Kingdom
United Kingdom > UK
United States > US
Chicago Illinois
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Summary:In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. Our methodology formalizes how the old mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism, including the new one. A number of similar transitions took place in England after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. Our approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
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ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/aer.103.1.80