Parity Demystified

Ruth Chang has defended a concept of “parity”, implying that two items may be evaluatively comparable even though neither item is better than or equally good as the other. This article takes no stand on whether there actually are cases of parity. Its aim is only to make the hitherto somewhat obscure...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inTheoria (Lund, Sweden) Vol. 76; no. 2; pp. 119 - 128
Main Author CARLSON, ERIK
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.05.2010
Subjects
comparability
Filosofiämnen
Historisk-filosofiska ämnen
History and philosophy subjects
HUMANIORA och RELIGIONSVETENSKAP
HUMANITIES and RELIGION
parity
Philosophy subjects
Ruth Chang
trichotomy thesis
value relations
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Summary:Ruth Chang has defended a concept of “parity”, implying that two items may be evaluatively comparable even though neither item is better than or equally good as the other. This article takes no stand on whether there actually are cases of parity. Its aim is only to make the hitherto somewhat obscure notion of parity more precise, by defining it in terms of the standard value relations. Given certain plausible assumptions, the suggested definiens is shown to state a necessary and sufficient condition for parity, as this relation is envisaged by Chang.
Bibliography:istex:DB4784FEB0A455534311F43E7D81CDDD5DCA0EC7
ark:/67375/WNG-T8SL19T3-F
ArticleID:THEO1063
ISSN:0040-5825
1755-2567
1755-2567
DOI:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01063.x