On the Adoption Problem and Meta-Logical Monism

• Published in: Análisis filosófico Vol. 42; no. 1; pp. 53 - 78
• Main Authors: Santelli, Mauro, Toranzo Calderón, Joaquín, Erenfryd, Jonathan
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: SADAF 01.05.2022; Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico (SADAF)
• Subjects: Filosofía de la Lógica; Filosofía del Lenguaje; Following; PHILOSOPHY; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Logic; Rule; rule-following; Seguimiento de reglas; Teorías del razonamiento; Theories of Reasoning; Philosophy of Language; Seguimiento de reglas; Teorías del razonamiento; Theories of Reasoning; Philosophy of Logic; Filosofía del Lenguaje; Rule-Following; Filosofía de la Lógica
• ISSN: 0326-1301; 1851-9636; 1851-9636
• DOI: 10.36446/af.2022.407

According to the Adoption Problem (AP) certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted. Drawing on the AP, Suki Finn presents an argument against logical pluralism: Modus Ponens (MP) and Universal Instantiation (UI) both govern a general structure shared by every logical rule. As such, analogues of these two rules must be present in every meta-logic for any logical system L, effectively imposing a restriction to logical pluralism at the meta-level through their presence constituting a “meta-logical monism”. We find a tension in the dual role that the “unadoptable rules” must play in Finn’s “meta-logical monism” rendering it ineffective to restrict logical theories and systems. Consequently, we argue they cannot be both analogues of MP and UI and inferentially productive. We conclude with a series of suggestions regarding where a more satisfying and robust interpretation of the AP could lie.