Consciousness of the self (COS) and explicit knowledge

Starting with Dienes and Perner’s (1999) distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge and the traditional philosophical distinction between COS (the consciousness of self) as an object and COS as a subject, we suggest a triple classification of COS experience into three modes, each correspond...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inConsciousness and cognition Vol. 15; no. 4; pp. 655 - 661
Main Authors Pinku, Guy, Tzelgov, Joseph
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published United States Elsevier Inc 01.12.2006
Elsevier BV
Subjects
Behavior
Cognition
Cognition & reasoning
Consciousness
Ego
Explicit knowledge
Humans
Intended acts
Intention
Knowledge
Monitoring
Philosophy
Psychology
Self
Intended acts
Self
Explicit knowledge
Monitoring
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Summary:Starting with Dienes and Perner’s (1999) distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge and the traditional philosophical distinction between COS (the consciousness of self) as an object and COS as a subject, we suggest a triple classification of COS experience into three modes, each corresponding to a different state of consciousness. When one acts automatically COS is totally embedded within the representation of the environment. When one monitors or attends to one’s experience, the self is implied by an explicit representation of one’s attitudes, consistent with Descartes’ cogito insight ‘I think therefore I am’ (1641,1984). However, a reflexive thought, e.g., ‘I know fact x,’ requires an explicit representation of the self. This analysis highlights the existence of an intermediate mode of COS as a subject and suggests its possible connection to monitoring one’s behavior.
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ISSN:1053-8100
1090-2376
DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2005.10.001