In a small moment Class size and moral hazard in the Italian mezzogiorno

Instrumental variables (IV ) estimates show strong class-size effects in Southern Italy. But Italy's Mezzogiorno is distinguished by manipulation of standardized test scores as well as by economic disadvantage. IV estimates suggest small classes increase manipulation. We argue that score manipu...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAmerican economic journal. Applied economics Vol. 9; no. 4; pp. 216 - 249
Main Authors Angrist, Joshua David, Battistin, Erich, Vuri, Daniela
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published American Economic Association 01.10.2017
Subjects
Accountability
Bildungsniveau
Causal models
Class size
Economic models
Manipulation
Moral hazard
Moralische Kompetenz
Social conditions & trends
Süditalien
Teachers
Test scores
Italy
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Summary:Instrumental variables (IV ) estimates show strong class-size effects in Southern Italy. But Italy's Mezzogiorno is distinguished by manipulation of standardized test scores as well as by economic disadvantage. IV estimates suggest small classes increase manipulation. We argue that score manipulation is a consequence of teacher shirking. IV estimates of a causal model for achievement as a function of class size and score manipulation show that class-size effects on measured achievement are driven entirely by the relationship between class size and manipulation. These results illustrate how consequential score manipulation can arise even in assessment systems with few accountability concerns. (JEL D82, H75, I21, I26, I28, J24, R23)
ISSN:1945-7790
1945-7782
1945-7790
DOI:10.1257/app.20160267