The paradox of human rights conditionality in EU trade policy: when strategic interests drive policy outcomes

Increasingly, trade agendas are expanding to include non-commercial objectives such as the promotion of fundamental political and human rights. Although the European Parliament (EP) positions itself as an advocate of such objectives in the conclusion of European Union (EU) trade agreements, it rarel...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of European public policy Vol. 26; no. 9; pp. 1273 - 1291
Main Authors Meissner, Katharina L., McKenzie, Lachlan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Routledge 02.09.2019
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Advocacy
Canada
conditionality
European Parliament
European Union
Human rights
International trade
Legislatures
Negotiation
Public interest
Supporters
trade
Trade agreements
Trade policy
Canada
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Summary:Increasingly, trade agendas are expanding to include non-commercial objectives such as the promotion of fundamental political and human rights. Although the European Parliament (EP) positions itself as an advocate of such objectives in the conclusion of European Union (EU) trade agreements, it rarely insists on them in negotiations. Yet, in the negotiations with Canada, the EP successfully took a tough stance on a human rights conditionality clause. Why did the EP invest political resources in insisting on conditionality in the agreement with Canada - a country which is among the top five regarding fundamental rights? We argue that, due to limited organizational capacity, composite actors, such as the EP, have to select 'strategic issues' among political events that make them appear as unique supporters of public interest. In this context, composite actors factor in saliency in their utility calculation of investing political resources in a policy issue.
ISSN:1350-1763
1466-4429
DOI:10.1080/13501763.2018.1526203