Delegating strategic decision-making to machines: Dr. Strangelove Redux?
Will the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in strategic decision-making be stabilizing or destabilizing? What are the risks and trade-offs of pre-delegating military force to machines? How might non-nuclear state and non-state actors leverage AI to put pressure on nuclear states? This article anal...
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Published in | Journal of strategic studies Vol. 45; no. 3; pp. 439 - 477 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
London
Routledge
16.04.2022
Taylor & Francis Ltd |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Will the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in strategic decision-making be stabilizing or destabilizing? What are the risks and trade-offs of pre-delegating military force to machines? How might non-nuclear state and non-state actors leverage AI to put pressure on nuclear states? This article analyzes the impact of strategic stability of the use of AI in the strategic decision-making process, in particular, the risks and trade-offs of pre-delegating military force (or automating escalation) to machines. It argues that AI-enabled decision support tools - by substituting the role of human critical thinking, empathy, creativity, and intuition in the strategic decision-making process - will be fundamentally destabilizing if defense planners come to view AI's 'support' function as a panacea for the cognitive fallibilities of human analysis and decision-making. The article also considers the nefarious use of AIenhanced fake news, deepfakes, bots, and other forms of social media by non-state actors and state proxy actors, which might cause states to exaggerate a threat from ambiguous or manipulated information, increasing instability. |
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ISSN: | 0140-2390 1743-937X |
DOI: | 10.1080/01402390.2020.1759038 |