Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

• Published in: Thinking & Reasoning Vol. 25; no. 2; pp. 207 - 230
• Main Author: McAuliffe, William H. B.
• Format: Journal Article Book Review
• Language: English
• Published: Hove Routledge 03.04.2019; Taylor & Francis Ltd
• Subjects: Anger; disgust; Emotions; Judgment; Moral emotion; moral judgment; Morality; Psychologists; sentimentalism
• ISSN: 1354-6783; 1464-0708
• DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2018.1499552

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare-the core concepts of rationalist theories- interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.