Reputational drivers and deterrents of accountability: why are some EU agencies subject to more intense account-holding than others?

• Published in: Journal of European public policy Vol. 30; no. 12; pp. 2739 - 2763
• Main Author: Leidorf-Tidå, Benjamin
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: London Routledge 02.12.2023; Taylor & Francis Ltd
• Subjects: account-holding intensity; Accountability; EU agencies; Government agencies; Public policy; reputation; Visibility
• ISSN: 1350-1763; 1466-4429
• DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2022.2128856

Empirical studies have shown how some (semi-)independent agencies are intensely scrutinised by various public account-holders, while others are overlooked. Such variations in account-holding intensity have also been observed for EU agencies. This article aims to explain variations in the account-holding intensities that EU agencies are subject to. To this end, the account-holding that EU agencies experience from six major institutional EU account-holders has been measured based on a novel conceptualisation of 'account-holding intensity' as a combination of both the 'frequency' and the 'diligence' of account-holding. Based on a reputational perspective on accountability, public visibility and salience is hypothesised to drive account-holding intensity, and reputational strength and reputation-sourced authority is hypothesised to deter account-holding intensity. While reputational strength is not found to deter the overall account-holding intensities that EU agencies are subject to, results provide support for the hypothesis that public visibility and salience drive account-holding intensity.