Excess executive compensation and corporate governance in the United Kingdom and Spain: A comparative analysis

Literature on executive compensation has relatively neglected the impact of institutional governance contexts. Regarding filling this gap, this study examines the influence of governance mechanisms on excess executive compensation comparing a set of listed UK and Spanish firms on an 8‐year panel dat...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inManagerial and decision economics Vol. 43; no. 7; pp. 2817 - 2837
Main Authors Sánchez‐Marín, Gregorio, Lucas‐Pérez, María Encarnación, Baixauli‐Soler, Samuel, Main, Brian G.M., Mínguez‐Vera, Antonio
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chichester Wiley Periodicals Inc 01.10.2022
Subjects
Companies
Comparative analysis
Compensation
Corporate governance
Ownership
Panel data
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Summary:Literature on executive compensation has relatively neglected the impact of institutional governance contexts. Regarding filling this gap, this study examines the influence of governance mechanisms on excess executive compensation comparing a set of listed UK and Spanish firms on an 8‐year panel data. Findings indicate that Spanish firms are characterized by higher excess executive compensation than UK firms because of the less effectiveness of ownership structure and board of directors. Differences in concentration and structure of ownership as well as in composition and size of boards result in more aligned executive compensation design in the UK firms.
Bibliography:Funding information
Ministry of Science and Innovation, Grant/Award Number: ECO2017‐84209‐P
ISSN:0143-6570
1099-1468
DOI:10.1002/mde.3564