Stereotypes and tournament self-selection: A theoretical and experimental approach

We present a theoretical model in which agents have imperfect self-knowledge about their abilities and have to self-select into either a high-paying or a low-paying tournament. The model shows that negative (positive) stereotypes generate underrepresentation (overrepresentation) of stereotyped agent...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEuropean economic review Vol. 126; p. 103448
Main Author Hernandez-Arenaz, Iñigo
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.07.2020
Subjects
Competitive sorting
Segregation
Self-assessment
Self-stereotyping
Stereotypes
D84
Self-stereotyping
C79
Segregation
Competitive sorting
Self-assessment
C91
Stereotypes
J24
J16
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Summary:We present a theoretical model in which agents have imperfect self-knowledge about their abilities and have to self-select into either a high-paying or a low-paying tournament. The model shows that negative (positive) stereotypes generate underrepresentation (overrepresentation) of stereotyped agents in the high-paying tournament even when the stereotype is false. This is because stereotypes affect self-assessment and consequently subsequent behavior. We call this mechanism self-stereotyping. We run a lab experiment in which we use subjects’ beliefs about the gender bias of a real-effort task to test the predictions of the theoretical model. The results of the experiment are in line with the predictions of the model for men but not for women, which partially validates the model and the self-stereotyping mechanism.
ISSN:0014-2921
1873-572X
DOI:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103448