Delusions and Dispositionalism about Belief

• Published in: Mind & language Vol. 26; no. 5; pp. 596 - 628
• Main Author: TUMULTY, MAURA
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.11.2011; Blackwell
• Subjects: Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge; Philosophy; Belief; Delirium
• ISSN: 0268-1064; 1468-0017
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01432.x

The imperviousness of delusions to counter‐evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states...