Delusions and Dispositionalism about Belief

The imperviousness of delusions to counter‐evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inMind & language Vol. 26; no. 5; pp. 596 - 628
Main Author TUMULTY, MAURA
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.11.2011
Blackwell
Subjects
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Philosophy
Belief
Delirium
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Summary:The imperviousness of delusions to counter‐evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk‐psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do competing accounts of belief.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-1N625J2J-N
istex:70691FDB641C3AFCD25F9AE6294518FAD579DC0F
ArticleID:MILA1432
Mind & Language
for their valuable suggestions.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in Bloomington, IN (June 2009). I am grateful to the audience, and especially to Kristin Andrews, my commentator on that occasion, for helpful comments. The paper was expanded during a Junior Faculty Leave granted by Colgate University. Eric Schwitzgebel offered insightful comments on a draft. Finally, I am grateful to two anonymous referees at
ISSN:0268-1064
1468-0017
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01432.x