Evolutionary game theory: A renaissance

Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGames Vol. 9; no. 2; pp. 1 - 67
Main Author Newton, Jonathan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Basel MDPI 01.06.2018
MDPI AG
Subjects
agency
Altruism
assortativity
Behavior
Cooperation
culture
Decision making
distributed systems
dynamics
Equilibrium
Evolution
Game theory
Rationality
Social sciences
Society
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Summary:Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying particular attention to the work of young researchers, this essay surveys the progress made over the last decade towards understanding these phenomena, and discusses open research topics of importance to economics and the broader social sciences.
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ISSN:2073-4336
2073-4336
DOI:10.3390/g9020031