On game-theoretic power control under successive interference cancellation

• Published in: IEEE transactions on wireless communications Vol. 8; no. 4; pp. 1655 - 1657
• Main Authors: St. Jean, C.A., Jabbari, B.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York, NY IEEE 01.04.2009; Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
• Subjects: Applied sciences; Cancellation; Detection, estimation, filtering, equalization, prediction; Dynamic tests; Exact sciences and technology; Game theory; Information, signal and communications theory; Interference; Interference cancellation; Mathematical analysis; Miscellaneous; Multiaccess communication; Multiuser detection; Networks; Performance analysis; Power control; Signal and communications theory; Signal detection; Signal processing; Signal to noise ratio; Signal, noise; Silicon carbide; successive interference cancellation; Systems, networks and services of telecommunications; Telecommunications; Telecommunications and information theory; Transmission and modulation (techniques and equipments); Wireless communication; Wireless networks; Multiuser detection; Interference suppression; Power control; Noise reduction; Code division multiple access; Analytical method; Signal processing; Uplink; Direct sequence; Game theory; Signal detection; successive interference cancellation
• ISSN: 1536-1276; 1558-2248
• DOI: 10.1109/TWC.2009.080317

Game-theoretic analytical techniques have been applied, of late, to uplink power control in DS-CDMA networks. We extend our previous analysis [1] of game-theoretic power control under successive interference cancellation performed under a dynamic cancellation ordering. Both continuous and discrete power control are investigated. Under continuous power control, we prove the nonexistence of a symmetric power control equilibrium, illustrating that no easily applicable equilibrium existence result applies to this power control problem. Under discrete power control, we demonstrate empirically a high probability of equilibrium if the action set is not too precise, an encouraging result in the absence of a pure-strategy equilibrium guarantee.