The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence

• Published in: Erkenntnis Vol. 79; no. 1; pp. 19 - 44
• Main Author: Coleman, Sam
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer 01.02.2014; Springer Netherlands; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Consciousness; Consciousness theory; Education; Emergentism; Epistemology; Ethics; Logic; Metaphysics; Molecules; Neutral monism; Ontology; Original Article; Panpsychism; Phenomenology; Philosophy; Physicalism; Qualia; Subjectivity; Phenomenal Consciousness; Combination Problem; Phenomenal Property; Substantial Identity; Phenomenal Quality
• ISSN: 0165-0106; 1572-8420
• DOI: 10.1007/s10670-013-9431-x

Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist position, the seriousness of which has yet to be appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer advice to panpsychists on how to resolve it. The dilemma is as follows: Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature phenomenal properties, plus micro-subjects to whom these properties belong. However, it is impossible to explain the generation of a macro-subject (like one of us) in terms of the assembly of micro-subjects, for, as I show, subjects cannot combine. Therefore the panpsychist explanatory project is derailed by the insistence that the world's ultimate material constituents are subjects of experience. The panpsychist faces a choice of giving up her explanatory ambitions, or of giving up the claim that the ultimates are subjects. I argue that the latter option is preferable, leading to neutral monism, on which phenomenal qualities are irreducible but subjects are reducible. So panpsychists should be neutral monists.