Responders’ dissatisfaction may provoke fair offer

In this article, we attempt to explain the fair outcome of ultimatum game experiments using the evolutionary dynamics. The players of the game, the proposers and the responders, are randomly matched to play the game. When the responders face low offers from the proposers, their decisions are influen...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of economic interaction and coordination Vol. 7; no. 2; pp. 197 - 207
Main Authors Xie, Wenxin, Li, Yong, Wang, Yougui, Li, Keqiang
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Berlin/Heidelberg Springer-Verlag 01.10.2012
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Analysis
Computer Appl. in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Differential equations
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Equilibrium
Experiments
Finance
Game theory
Mathematical and Computational Physics
Population
Regular Article
Studies
Theoretical
D63
Replicator dynamics
Sub-game perfect
Evolutionary equilibrium
D03
C73
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Summary:In this article, we attempt to explain the fair outcome of ultimatum game experiments using the evolutionary dynamics. The players of the game, the proposers and the responders, are randomly matched to play the game. When the responders face low offers from the proposers, their decisions are influenced by not only the monetary payoff but also their feelings. To quantify the responders’ feelings, a degree of dissatisfaction is introduced into the game. Asymmetrical replicator dynamics is used to study the evolution of the proportion of players with different strategies. The solutions of the differential equations exhibit complex outcomes mainly depending on the degree of dissatisfaction. It could also be inferred from our results that people can maintain their rights and interests well when they have a strong sense of unfairness.
ISSN:1860-711X
1860-7128
DOI:10.1007/s11403-012-0092-7