The possibility of a pluralist cognitive science

A case for a pluralistic approach to cognitive science is sketched. It is argued that cognitive scientists should take seriously the possibility that a single, unified framework for all of cognition is an unrealistic expectation for its diverse interdisciplinary goals and subject matter. A pluralist...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of experimental & theoretical artificial intelligence Vol. 20; no. 3; pp. 155 - 179
Main Author Dale, Rick
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Taylor & Francis Group 01.09.2008
Subjects
cognitive science
complexity
computation
dynamics
pluralism
pragmatism
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Summary:A case for a pluralistic approach to cognitive science is sketched. It is argued that cognitive scientists should take seriously the possibility that a single, unified framework for all of cognition is an unrealistic expectation for its diverse interdisciplinary goals and subject matter. A pluralistic approach instead seeks ways of integrating the multiple perspectives that have provided explanatory success in loosely interconnected sub-domains of cognitive phenomena. Research strategies recommended by this approach are discussed, with review of research currently carrying out such strategies and others that may hold promise for the future. The article ends with a discussion of seeking closer integration of the inquirer into consideration of which explanatory framework to choose. A systematic exploration of this transactional approach to cognitive science may grant coherence to pluralism even as it embraces diverse schemes of explanation.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
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ISSN:0952-813X
1362-3079
DOI:10.1080/09528130802319078