The Social Value Theory of Orthodoxy: A Review and Critique

• Published in: Journal of economic issues Vol. 14; no. 2; pp. 309 - 326
• Main Author: Tool, Marc R.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Lincoln Routledge 01.06.1980; Division of Research and Department of Economics, Graduate School of Business Administration, Michigan State University; Dept. of Economics, California State University; Association for Evolutionary Economics
• Subjects: Ambivalence; Axioms; Economic theory; Economic utility; Economic value; Economic value theories; Economics; General Economic Theory and Capitalism: I; Maximization; Moral relativism; Normativity; Orthodoxy; Pareto optimum; Positivism; Principles; Relativism; Social; Social accounting; Theory; Utility; Utility maximization; Value
• ISSN: 0021-3624; 1946-326X
• DOI: 10.1080/00213624.1980.11503747

An attempt is made to help demonstrate that the views concerning social value of mainstream theorists are inadmissible on philosophical grounds and inapplicable on pragmatic grounds and that a more warrantable social value theory is needed if headway is to be made in resolving major economic problems which are now producing agonizing, divisive, and destructive consequences. From the perspective of neoinstitutionalism, a review and critique of the social position of orthodoxy is presented. Orthodoxy refers to the contributions of the neoclassical Marshallian utilitarian theorists and their intellectual progeny, as well as the Paretian and Hicksian revisionists, including axiomatic theorists. The value positions of these constituents of orthodoxy are considered and appraised. For Marshallian utilitarians, utility is the referent for social value, and price is its measure. However, utility is inadmissible as a principle of social value because it is tautological, relativistic, and inapplicable. The Paretian optimum is by design a criterion of social value, even though perceived by some as a way of avoiding utility value judgments.