Social insurance payments and labour investment efficiency: A quasi-natural experiment

This study exploits the passage of the 2011 Social Insurance (SI) Law in China to investigate how a labour protection regulation affects corporate labour investment efficiency (LIE). We find that labour-intensive firms invest more efficiently in labour after the SI Law. Our findings are robust to al...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inApplied economics letters Vol. 31; no. 6; pp. 497 - 502
Main Authors Wang, Qing Sophie, Lai, Shaojie
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Routledge 29.03.2024
Taylor & Francis LLC
Subjects
Decision making
Economic analysis
employee-friendly
Employment
Investments
Labor
Labor law
labour investment
Payments
Regulation
Selection bias
Social Insurance Law
Social insurance premium
Social security
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Summary:This study exploits the passage of the 2011 Social Insurance (SI) Law in China to investigate how a labour protection regulation affects corporate labour investment efficiency (LIE). We find that labour-intensive firms invest more efficiently in labour after the SI Law. Our findings are robust to alternative measures, selection bias and endogeneity concerns. Overall, our findings show that labour protection regulations have a profound impact on corporate employment decision-making.
ISSN:1350-4851
1466-4291
DOI:10.1080/13504851.2022.2139797