Role of Information Sharing on the Impact of Foreign Banks’ Penetration on Banking Competition

Globalization has led to an increase in foreign banks’ penetration. It is argued that the presence of foreign banks may affect the banking sector of the host countries in several ways including their competition level. It is mentioned that the presence of the foreign banks could heightened the level...

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Published inThe Journal of Asian finance, economics, and business Vol. 7; no. 11; pp. 707 - 715
Main Authors ZOHREHVAND, Azadeh, IBRAHIM, Saifuzzaman, HABIBULLAH, Muzafar Shah, YUSOP, Zulkornain, MAZLAN, Nur Syazwani
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 한국유통과학회 30.11.2020
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Summary:Globalization has led to an increase in foreign banks’ penetration. It is argued that the presence of foreign banks may affect the banking sector of the host countries in several ways including their competition level. It is mentioned that the presence of the foreign banks could heightened the level of competition in the banking sector. Nonetheless, the impact of the foreign banks on competition could be influenced by the degree of information sharing in the banking industry. This study investigates the role of information sharing in moderating the impact of foreign bank penetration on host banking sector competition in selected developing countries. We employ panel data samples of 54 developing countries during the period from 1998 to 2016. The estimation is carried out using the two-step system of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regression technique. This technique is adopted due to its robustness to all forms of endogeneity. The findings of this study show that the presence of information sharing could affect the relationship between foreign banks’ penetration and competition. They suggest that improvement in information sharing by a host country may help foreign banks to improve monitoring and reduce the moral hazard and adverse selection problem.
ISSN:2288-4637
2288-4645
DOI:10.13106/jafeb.2020.vol7.no11.707