"We Feel Our Freedom": Imagination and Judgment in the Thought of Hannah Arendt

Critics of Hannah Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy argue that Arendt fails to address the most important problem of political judgment, namely, validity. This essay shows that Arendt does indeed have an answer to the problem that preoccupies her critics, with one important...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPolitical theory Vol. 33; no. 2; pp. 158 - 188
Main Author Zerilli, Linda M. G.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Thousand Oaks, CA Sage Publications 01.04.2005
SAGE Publications
Sage
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
Subjects
20th century
Aesthetic judgment
Aesthetics
Arendt, Hannah
Classical rhetoric
Freedom
Freedoms
Historical studies (History of philosophy. History of ideas)
Imagination
Intellectual freedom
Intellectual History
Judgement
Judgment
Kant, Immanuel
Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804)
Philosophy
Political philosophy
Political rhetoric
Political theory
Rationality
Rhetoric
Spoken communication
Century 20
Critique of Judgment
political judgment
political freedom
rhetoric
Hannah Arendt
Liberty;Freedom
Validity
Hannah Amndt
Imagination
Political philosophy
Philosophy history
Arendt (H.)
Judgment
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Summary:Critics of Hannah Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy argue that Arendt fails to address the most important problem of political judgment, namely, validity. This essay shows that Arendt does indeed have an answer to the problem that preoccupies her critics, with one important caveat: she does not think that validity is the all-important problem of political judgment--the affirmation of human freedom is.
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ISSN:0090-5917
1552-7476
DOI:10.1177/0090591704272958