THE NEW LEGAL ANTI-POSITIVISM

According to a recent wave of work by legal anti-positivists, legal norms are a subset of moral norms. This striking “one-system” view of law has rapidly become the dominant form of anti-positivism, but its implications have so far been little tested. This article argues that the one-system view lea...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inLegal theory Vol. 26; no. 3; pp. 181 - 213
Main Author Dindjer, Hasan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.09.2020
Subjects
Correspondence
Morality
Norms
Positivism
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Summary:According to a recent wave of work by legal anti-positivists, legal norms are a subset of moral norms. This striking “one-system” view of law has rapidly become the dominant form of anti-positivism, but its implications have so far been little tested. This article argues that the one-system view leads systematically to untenable conclusions about what legal rights and obligations we have. For many clear legal norms, the view lacks the resources to explain the existence of corresponding moral norms. And its criteria for distinguishing legal norms within morality imply an under- or over-inclusive set of legal norms. I stress the special difficulties that apply beyond obligations, in the case of privileges and powers, and I show that the view's problems do not only—or mainly—concern egregiously unjust law, or indeed morally defective law at all. I close with reflections on legal normativity and the prospects for different forms of anti-positivism.
ISSN:1352-3252
1469-8048
DOI:10.1017/S1352325220000208