Farmers’ preferences for result-based schemes for grassland conservation in Slovenia

• Published in: Journal for nature conservation Vol. 66; p. 126143
• Main Authors: Šumrada, Tanja, Japelj, Anže, Verbič, Miroslav, Erjavec, Emil
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier GmbH 01.04.2022
• Subjects: Agri-environmental measure; agricultural policy; Biodiversity conservation; Choice experiment; Collective bonus; ecosystems; grasslands; logit analysis; natural resources conservation; Payments for ecosystem services; Result-based scheme; Slovenia; Slovenia; Collective bonus; Biodiversity conservation; Result-based scheme; Payments for ecosystem services; Agri-environmental measure; Choice experiment
• ISSN: 1617-1381; 1618-1093
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jnc.2022.126143

•Farmers’ preferences for payment conditions, monitoring and training were analysed.•A high preference for result-based schemes and monitoring was found.•Farmers preferred a more individualised approach to training.•A collective bonus had a positive influence but was considered less important.•Older and smaller farmers were unwilling to enter the scheme regardless of design. Government-funded payments for ecosystem services (PES) have increasingly been used to facilitate transactions between users of environmental services and their providers. In order to improve the link between payments and the service provided, some countries in the EU have promoted result-based schemes (RBS), which remunerate farmers for ecological results, as part of their agricultural policy. Since PES programs are voluntary, it is important to understand farmers’ responses before more large-scale implementations of RBS are initiated. Using a choice experiment and a mixed logit model, we elicited the preferences of farmers in two Natura 2000 sites in Slovenia for different design elements of a hypothetical scheme for dry grassland conservation. We found that the majority of farmers preferred the result-based approach over the management-based scheme both in terms of payment conditions and monitoring; one group of farmers preferred the RBS very strongly (average WTA of more than 500 EUR/ha/yr) and another group less strongly (average WTA about 200 EUR/ha/yr). Farmers also showed a higher preference for on-farm advise and training in small groups than for lectures, which would be offered to a larger audience. A collective bonus, which would incentivise coordination and could potentially increase participation rates in the scheme, significantly influenced the farmers’ willingness to adopt the scheme. However, the estimated average WTA was comparable or lower than the 40 EUR/ha annual bonus payment. Older farmers and those who managed small and semi-subsistent farms were significantly more likely to be highly resistant to scheme adoption no matter its design.